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ABSTRACT
We endow Brewka’s prioritised default logic (PDL) with
argumentation semantics using the ASPIC+ framework for
structured argumentation. We prove that the conclusions of
the justified arguments correspond to the prioritised default
extensions in a normatively rational manner. Argumentation
semantics for PDL will allow for the application of argument
game proof theories to the process of inference in PDL, mak-
ing the reasons for accepting a conclusion transparent and
the inference process more intuitive. This also opens up the
possibility for argumentation-based distributed reasoning and
communication amongst agents with PDL representations of
mental attitudes.
General Terms
Theory
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1. INTRODUCTION
Dung’s argumentation theory [8] has become established as
a general framework for non-monotonic reasoning (NMR).
Given a set of well-formed formulae (wffs) ∆ in some non-
monotonic logic (NML), the arguments and attacks defined
by ∆ instantiate a Dung argumentation framework. Addi-
tionally, a preference relation over the defined arguments
can be used to determine which attacks succeed as defeats.
The justified arguments are then evaluated under various
Dung semantics, and the claims of the sceptically justified
arguments (i.e. arguments contained in all extensions under
some semantics) identify the inferences from the underly-
ing ∆. More formally, given an argumentation framework
AF and a wff θ, the argumentation-defined inference re-
lation |∼AF over ∆ is ∆ |∼AF θ iff θ is the conclusion of
a sceptically justified argument in AF . Indeed, a corres-
pondence has been shown between |∼AF over ∆, and the
instantiating logic’s non-monotonic inference relation defined
directly over ∆. For example, default logic (DL) [8], logic
programming [8], defeasible logic [10] and preferred subtheor-
ies (PS) [13] have all been been endowed with argumentation
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semantics. This in turn allows the application of argument
game proof theories [12] to the process of inference, and the
generalisation of these dialectical proof theories to distributed
NMR amongst computational agents, whereby agents can
engage in argumentation-based dialogues, submitting argu-
ments and counter-arguments from their own non-monotonic
knowledge bases [1, 11, 14]. Furthermore, argumentative
characterisations of NMR make use of principles familiar in
everyday reasoning and debate, thus rendering transparent
the reasons for accepting a conclusion and allowing for human
participation and inspection of the inference process.
One well-studied NML that has not yet been endowed with
argumentation semantics is Brewka’s prioritised default logic
(PDL) [4]. PDL is important because it upgrades DL [16] with
priorities over defaults, so that, for example, one can account
for recent information taking priority over information in the
distant past, or that more specific information should take
priority over more general information. PDL has also been
used to represent the (possibly conflicting) beliefs, obligations,
intentions and desires (BOID) of agents, and model how these
different categories of mental attitudes override each other in
order to generate goals and actions that attain those goals [6].
This paper contributes to research in argumentative char-
acterisations of NMR, by endowing PDL with argumentation
semantics, proving a correspondence between PDL inference
and the inference relation defined by the argumentation se-
mantics, and proving that the result is normatively rational.
We realise these contributions by appropriately instantiating
the ASPIC+ framework for structured argumentation [13].
ASPIC+ identifies conditions under which logics and prefer-
ence relations instantiating Dung’s frameworks satisfy the
Caminada-Amgoud rationality postulates [7].
In Section 2, we review ASPIC+ and PDL. In Section 3,
we define a PDL instantiation of ASPIC+. In Section 5,
we present a representation theorem proving that inferences
defined by the argumentation semantics correspond exactly
to inferences in PDL under an appropriate preference relation
devised in Section 4. We will also prove that this instantiation
is normatively rational in the sense of [7]. In Section 6 we
discuss possible generalisations of PDL via its argumentation
semantics.
2. BACKGROUND
In the remainder of this paper we make use of the following
notation: “:=” means “is defined as”. N is the set of natural
numbers. For a set X its power set is P (X) and its finite
power set (set of all finite subsets) is Pfin(X). X ⊆fin Y iff
X is a finite subset of Y , therefore X ∈ Pfin(Y )⇔ X ⊆fin Y .
Undefined quantities are denoted by ∗, for example 1/0 = ∗
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in the real numbers. If 〈P, ≤〉 is a preordered set then the
strict version of the preorder is a < b⇔ [a ≤ b, b 6≤ a], which
is also a strict partial order. For two sets A, B, A 	 B :=
(A−B) ∪ (B −A) denotes their symmetric difference.
2.1 Dung’s Abstract Argumentation Theory
We now recap the key definitions of [8]. An argumentation
framework is a directed graph 〈A, C〉, where A is the set of
arguments and C ⊆ A2 is the conflict relation on A. For
arguments A, B ∈ A we write C(A, B)⇔ (A, B) ∈ C ⇔ A
conflicts with B, i.e. A is a counterargument against B.
In what follows let S ⊆ A and A, B ∈ A. S conflicts
with B iff (∃A ∈ S) C(A, B). S is conflict-free (cf) iff C ∩
S2 = ∅. S defends A iff (∀B ∈ A) [C(B, A) ⇒ S conflicts
with B]. Let Def(S) := {A ∈ A S defends A} ⊆ A. S is
an admissible extension iff S is cf and S ⊆ Def(S). An
admissible extension S is: a complete extension iff S =
Def(S); a preferred extension iff S is a ⊆-maximal complete
extension; the grounded extension iff S is the⊆-least complete
extension; a stable extension iff S is complete and conflicts
with all arguments B ∈ A− S.
Let S := {complete, preferred, grounded, stable} be the
set of Dung semantics. An argument A ∈ A is sceptically
justified under the semantics s ∈ S iff A belongs to all
s-extensions of 〈A, C〉.
2.2 The ASPIC+ Framework
2.2.1 Arguments, Attacks, Preferences and Defeats
Dung’s framework provides an intuitive calculus of opposi-
tion for determining the justified arguments based on conflict
alone; it abstracts from the internal logical structure of argu-
ments, the nature of defeats and how they are determined by
preferences, and consideration of the conclusions of the argu-
ments. However, these features are referenced when studying
whether any given logical instantiation of a framework yields
complete extensions that satisfy the rationality postulates
of [7]. ASPIC+ [13] provides a structured account of ab-
stract argumentation, allowing one to reference the above
features, while at the same time accommodating a wide range
of instantiating logics and preference relations.1 ASPIC+
then identifies conditions under which complete extensions
defined by the arguments, attacks and preferences, satisfy
the rationality postulates of [7], and are hence normatively
rational.
In ASPIC+, the tuple 〈L, −, Rs, Rd, n〉 is an argument-
ation system, where L is a logical language, − : L → P(L)
is the contrary function θ 7→ θ that identifies when one wff
in L conflicts with another. Let θ1, . . . , θm, φ ∈ L be wffs
for m ∈ N+, Rs is the set of strict inference rules of the
form (θ1, . . . , θm → φ), denoting that if θ1, . . . , θm are
true then φ is also true, and Rd is the set of defeasible in-
ference rules of the form (θ1, . . . , θm ⇒ φ), denoting that
if θ1, . . . , θm are true then φ is tentatively true. For a
strict or defeasible rule r = (θ1, . . . θm → /⇒ φ), we define
Ante(r) := {θ1, . . . , θm} ⊆fin L, and Cons(r) := φ ∈ L. Fi-
nally n : Rd → L is a partial function that assigns a name
to some of the defeasible rules. For any S ⊆ L we define the
set ClRs(S) ⊆ L to be the smallest superset of S that also
contains Cons(r) for all r ∈ Rs such that Ante(r) ⊆ ClRs(S).
We call ClRs the closure under strict rules operator.
1ASPIC stands for Argumentation Service Platform with
Integrated Components.
In ASPIC+, a knowledge base is a set K := Kn ∪ Kp ⊆ L
where Kn is the set of axioms and Kp is the set of ordinary
premises. Intuitively, the knowledge base consists of premises
used in the construction of arguments. Given an argument-
ation system and knowledge base, an argument is defined
inductively as:
1. (Base) [θ] is a singleton argument with θ ∈ K, conclu-
sion Conc([θ]) := θ, premise set Prem ([θ]) := {θ} ⊆ K,
top rule TopRule([θ]) := ∗ and set of subarguments is
Sub ([θ]) := {[θ]}.
2. (Inductive, strict) Let A1, . . . , An be arguments with
respective conclusions Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An) and
premise sets Prem(A1), . . . , Prem(An). If there is a
strict rule r := (Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An) → φ) ∈
Rs, then B := [A1, . . . , An → φ] is also an ar-
gument with Conc(B) = φ, premises Prem(B) :=⋃n
i=1 Prem(Ai), TopRule(B) = r ∈ Rs and set of sub-
arguments Sub(B) := {B} ∪⋃ni=1 Sub(Ai).
3. (Inductive, defeasible) Let A1, . . . , An be arguments
with respective conclusions Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)
and premise sets Prem(A1), . . . , Prem(An). If there
is a defeasible rule r′ := (Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)⇒
φ) ∈ Rd, then C := [A1, . . . , An ⇒ φ] is an ar-
gument with Conc(C) = φ, premises Prem(C) :=⋃n
i=1 Prem(Ai), TopRule(C) = r
′ ∈ Rd and set of
subarguments Sub(C) := {C} ∪⋃ni=1 Sub(Ai).
Let A be the (unique) set of all arguments constructed in
this way. It is clear that arguments are finite objects.
Two arguments are equal iff they are constructed identic-
ally in the above manner. We say A is a subargument of
B iff A ∈ Sub(B) and we write A ⊆arg B. We say A is a
proper subargument of B iff A ∈ Sub(B)−{B} and we write
A ⊂arg B. It can be shown that ⊆arg is at least a preorder
on Sub(B).
An argument A ∈ A is firm iff Prem(A) ⊆ Kn. Fur-
ther, DR(A) ⊆ Rd is the set of defeasible rules applied in
constructing A. An argument A is strict iff DR(A) = ∅,
else A is defeasible. Given R ⊆ Rd, we introduce the set
of all arguments freely constructed with defeasible rules re-
stricted to those in R as the set Args(R) ⊆ A, which are
all arguments with premises in K, strict rules in Rs and
defeasible rules in R. Formally, Args(R) is defined induct-
ively just as arguments are constructed. It is easy to show
that A ∈ Args(R)⇔ DR(A) ⊆ R. Clearly, Args(Rd) = A.
Given R, Args(R) is unique. Further, Args(R) is closed
under subarguments, i.e. A ∈ Args(R) and B ⊆arg A implies
B ∈ Args(R).
An argument A attacks another argument B, denoted as
A ⇀ B, iff at least one of the following hold, where:
1. A is said to undermine attack B on the subargument
B′ = [φ] iff [∃φ ∈ Prem(B) ∩ Kp] Conc(A) ∈ φ, i.e. A
conflicts with some ordinary premise of B.
2. There is some B′ ⊆arg B such that r := TopRule (B′) ∈
Rd, φ := Cons(r) and Conc(A) ∈ φ. A is then said to
rebut attack B on the subargument B′.
3. There is some B′ ⊆arg B such that r := TopRule(B′) ∈
Rd and Conc(A) ∈ n(r). A is then said to undercut
attack B on the subargument B′ (by arguing against
the application of the defeasible rule r in B).
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See [13, Section 2] for a further discussion of why attacks are
distinguished in this way. We abuse notation to define the
attack relation as ⇀⊆ A2 such that (A, B) ∈⇀⇔ A ⇀ B.
A preference relation over arguments is then used to de-
termine which attacks succeed as defeats. We denote the
preference -⊆ A2 (not necessarily a preorder for now) such
that A - B ⇔ A is not more preferred than B. The strict
version is A ≺ B ⇔ [A - B, B 6- A], and equivalence is
A ≈ B ⇔ [A - B, B - A]. We define a defeat as
A ↪→ B ⇔ (∃B′ ⊆arg B) [A ⇀ B′, A 6≺ B′] . (2.1)
That is to say, A defeats B (on B′) iff A attacks B on the
subargument B′, and B′ is not strictly preferred to A. Notice
the comparison is made at the subargument B′ instead of
the whole argument B. We then abuse notation to define the
defeat relation as ↪→⊆ A2 such that (A, B) ∈↪→⇔ A ↪→ B. A
set of arguments S ⊆ A is conflict-free (cf) iff ↪→ ∩S2 = ∅.2
Preferences between arguments are calculated from the
argument structure by endowing Kp and Rd with preorders
≤K and ≤D respectively, where (e.g.) r1 ≤D r2 iff r2 is more
preferred than r1 (and analogously for ≤K). This preorder
is then lifted to a set-comparison order E between the sets
of premises or defeasible rules of the arguments, and then
finally to -, following the method in [13, Section 5]. We will
summarise this in Section 4.
Given the preference relation - between arguments, we
call the structure 〈A, ⇀, -〉 an ASPIC+ SAF (structured
argumentation framework), or attack graph. Its correspond-
ing defeat graph is 〈A, ↪→〉, where ↪→ is defined in terms of
⇀ and - as in Equation 2.1.
Given 〈A, ↪→〉 one can then evaluate the extensions un-
der Dung’s semantics (Section 2.1) where C is ↪→, and thus
identify the argumentation defined inferences as the conclu-
sions of the sceptically justified arguments as follows. Let
AS be an argumentation system. The argumentation-defined
inference relation |∼AS is K |∼AS θ iff θ = Conc(A) where
A ∈ A is a sceptically justified argument.
2.2.2 Normative Rationality
Instantiations of ASPIC+ should satisfy some properties to
ensure it is rational [7]. Given an instantiation let 〈A, ⇀, -〉
be its ASPIC+ attack graph with corresponding defeat graph
〈A, ↪→〉. For S ⊆ A let Conc(S) := ⋃A∈S Conc(A). Let E
be any of its admissible extensions. The Caminada-Amgoud
rationality postulates state:
1. If E is a complete extension then E is subargument
closed.
2. If E is a complete extension then
ClRs [Conc(E)] = Conc(E) . (2.2)
3. The sets Conc(E), ClRs [Conc(E)] ⊆ L are consistent.
An ASPIC+ instantiation is normatively rational iff it sat-
isfies these rationality postulates. These postulates may be
proved directly given an instantiation, as we will show for
our instantiation to PDL in Theorem 5.4. ASPIC+ also iden-
tifies sufficient conditions for an instantiation to satisfy these
postulates [13, Section 4], which we will discuss in Section 6.
2Note that [13] studies two different notions of cf sets: one
where no two arguments attack each other, and the other
where no two arguments defeat each other. We choose the
latter notion of cf as this is more commonplace in argumenta-
tion formalisms that distinguish between attacks and defeats,
e.g. in [15].
2.3 Brewka’s Prioritised Default Logic
In this section we recap Brewka’s PDL [4]. We work in
full first order logic (FOL) of arbitrary signature where the
set of first-order formulae is FL and the set of closed first
order formulae3 is SL ⊆ FL, with the usual quantifiers
and connectives. Given S ⊆ FL, the deductive closure
of S is Th(S), and given θ ∈ FL, the addition operator
+ : P(FL)×FL → P (FL) is defined as S+θ := Th(S∪{θ}).
A normal default is an expression θ:φ
φ
where θ, φ ∈ FL and
read “if θ is the case and φ is consistent with what we know,
then φ is the case”. In this case we call θ the antecedent and φ
the consequent. A normal default θ:φ
φ
is closed iff θ, φ ∈ SL.
We will assume all defaults are closed and normal unless
stated otherwise. Given S ⊆ SL, a default is active (in S)
iff [θ ∈ S, φ /∈ S, ¬φ /∈ S]. Intuitively, the first requirement
says we need to know the antecedent before applying the
default, the second requirement is that the consequent must
add new information, and the third requirement ensures that
what we infer is consistent with what we know.
A finite prioritised default theory (PDT) is a structure
〈D, W, ≺〉, where W ⊆ SL is not necessarily a finite set
and 〈D, ≺〉 is a finite strict poset (partially ordered set)
of defaults, where d′ ≺ d ⇔ d is more4 prioritised than d′.
Intuitively, W are the known facts and D the defaults that
nonmonotonically extend W .
The inferences of a PDT are defined by its extensions.
Formally, let ≺+⊇≺ be a linearisation5 of ≺. A prioritised
default extension (with respect to ≺+) (PDE) is a set E :=⋃
i∈NEi ⊆ SL built inductively as:
E0 := Th(W ) and (2.3)
Ei+1 :=
{
Ei + φ , if property 1
Ei , else
(2.4)
where “property 1” iff “φ is the consequent of the ≺+-greatest
default d active in Ei”. Intuitively, one first generates all
classical consequences from the facts W , and then iteratively
adds the nonmonotonic consequences from the most prior-
itised default to the least. Notice if W is inconsistent then
E0 = E = FL.
It can be shown that the ascending chain Ei ⊆ Ei+1
stabilises at some finite i ∈ N and that E is consistent
provided that W is consistent. E does not have to be unique
because there are many distinct linearisations of ≺. We say
the PDT 〈D, W, ≺〉 sceptically infers θ ∈ SL iff θ ∈ E for
all extensions E.
Henceforth, we will refer to a PDT 〈D, W, ≺〉 where ≺
is a strict total order as a linearised PDT (LPDT). If ≺ is
total then there is only one way to apply the defaults in
D by Equation 2.4, hence the extension is unique and all
inferences are sceptical. In what follows, we will use ≺+ to
emphasise that the order is total.
Example 1. PDL can be used to model the mental atti-
tudes of agents when deliberating over which goals to pursue.
Suppose a research assistant Alice (a) is considering whether
she should teach undergraduates. We can model her mental
attitudes as a BOID agent’s PDT [6] as follows. Define the
3i.e. first order formulae without free variables
4 We have defined the order dually to [4] so as to comply
with orderings over the ASPIC+ defeasible inference rules.
5i.e. ≺+ is a strict total order and hence 〈D, ≺+〉 is a strict
toset (totally ordered set).
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predicates R(x)⇔ “x is a research assistant”, A(x)⇔ “x is
an academic”, and T (x)⇔ “x is teaching (undergraduates)”.
Alice is a research assistant, so W = {R(a)}. She believes
that research assistants are academics, so her set of beliefs
Bel has the default R(a):A(a)
A(a)
. She does not want to teach
and would rather focus on her research, so her set of desires
Des include R(a):¬T (a)¬T (a) . However, she is obliged to teach,
so her set of obligations Obl include A(a):T (a)
T (a)
. The set of
defaults is D = Bel ∪Des ∪ Obl, and we assume no other
defaults are relevant for this example.
In [6], the relative prioritisations of categories of men-
tal attitudes define different agent types. For example,
if Alice is a realistic selfish agent, the priority (abuse of
notation) is Obl ≺+ Des ≺+ Bel, and therefore the exten-
sion is Th ({R(a), A(a), ¬T (a)}). She thus generates the
goal ¬T (a), i.e. she does not teach. However, if she is
a realistic social agent, the priority (abuse of notation) is
Des ≺+ Obl ≺+ Bel, and therefore she teaches, as T (a) is in
the extension.
3. INSTANTIATING ASPIC+ TO PDL
We now instantiate ASPIC+ to PDL. Let
〈
D, W, ≺+〉 be a
LPDT.6
1. Our arguments are expressed in FOL, so our set of wffs
is FL.
2. The contrary function − syntactically defines conflict
in terms of classical negation.7 Let θ, φ be wffs, then
θ = φ if θ is of the form ¬φ; else φ = ¬θ.
3. The set of strict rules Rs characterises inference in first
order classical logic. We leave the proof theory implicit.
ClRs instantiates to deductive closure.
4. The set of defeasible rules Rd is defined as:
Rd :=
{
(θ ⇒ φ) θ : φ
φ
∈ D
}
, (3.1)
with n ≡ ∗. Clearly, there is a bijection8 f where
f : D →Rd : θ : φ
φ
7→ f
(
θ : φ
φ
)
:= (θ ⇒ φ) (3.2)
and we will define the strict version of the preorder
≤D over Rd as9
(θ ⇒ φ) <D (θ′ ⇒ φ′)⇔ θ : φ
φ
≺+ θ
′ : φ′
φ′
. (3.3)
We can see that the strict toset 〈Rd, <D〉 is order
isomorphic to
〈
D, ≺+〉, where the non-strict version
of the order ≤D is [<D or equality].
5. The set of axiom premises is Kn = W , because we take
W to be the set of facts. Furthermore, Kp = ∅.
6We will discuss why we only consider LPDTs in Section 6.
7For example, ¬(θ ∧ ¬φ) is the contrary of (θ ∧ ¬φ), but
(θ → φ), where → in this case denotes material implication,
is not the contrary of (θ ∧ ¬φ).
8Two defeasible rules are equal iff they have the same ante-
cedents and consequent syntactically.
9From Footnote 4, we do not need to define <D as the
order-theoretic dual to ≺+, avoiding potential confusion as
to which item is more preferred.
The set A of ASPIC+ arguments are defined as in Section
2.2. It is easy to see that all arguments are firm because
Kp = ∅, and so there are no undermining attacks. As n is
undefined, no attack can be an undercut. Therefore, we only
have rebut attacks, where A ⇀ B iff(∃B′, B′′ ⊆arg B) B′ = [B′′ ⇒ Conc(A)] . (3.4)
Defeats are defined as in Equation 2.1. This leaves the
question as to how the argument preference - should be
defined based on the strict total order <D over Rd.
4. PREFERENCES
We want to define - in such a way that the extension of the
LPDT
〈
D, W, ≺+〉 corresponds to the conclusions of the
justified arguments of the defeat graph 〈A, ↪→〉, instantiated
by the corresponding ASPIC+ instantiation, and the result
is rational. In ASPIC+, preferences over arguments are
calculated from the argument structure, and by comparing
the fallible information (ordinary premises and defeasible
rules) they contain. In our instantiation, we only compare
defeasible rules as there are no ordinary premises. Such a
comparison is then lifted to a comparison between the sets of
defeasible rules of two arguments, which is then lifted to -.
More formally, ASPIC+ defines the elitist order [13, Sec-
tion 5], where for A, B ∈ A and DR(A), DR(B) ⊆ Rd, the
argument preference - is
A - B ⇔ DR(A) EEli DR(B) , (4.1)
such that for10 Γ, Γ′ ⊆fin Rd,
Γ EEli Γ′ ⇔
[
Γ = Γ′ or Γ /Eli Γ
′] and (4.2)
Γ /Eli Γ
′ ⇔ (∃x ∈ Γ) (∀y ∈ Γ′) x <D y , (4.3)
where in Equation 4.3 the order <D is defined by
11 Equation
3.3. It is easy to show that - is a preorder on A, and
A ≈ B ⇔ DR(A) = DR(B). It is known that Brewka’s
preferred subtheories (PS) [3, Section 6] is a special case of
PDL, and the argumentation semantics for PS uses EEli to
calculate - [13]. Therefore, one might consider using EEli
(Equations 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3) for calculating -. But EEli
does not yield a correspondence with PDL as the following
example illustrates.
Example 2. Consider
〈
D, W, ≺+〉 where W = {a},
D =
{
d1 :=
a : b
b
, d2 :=
b : c
c
, d3 :=
b : ¬c
¬c
}
(4.4)
and d1 ≺+ d2 ≺+ d3. The extension is Th({a, b,¬c}).
In the ASPIC+ instantiation: r1 <D r2 <D r3 (where for
i = 1, 2, 3, ri := f(di) and f is Equation 3.2). The arguments
are A := [[[a] ⇒ b] ⇒ c] and B := [[[a] ⇒ b] ⇒ ¬c], which
rebut each other at their conclusions.
Under the elitist ordering (Equation 4.2), it is neither
the case that {r1, r2} /Eli {r1, r3} nor {r1, r3} /Eli {r1, r2}.
As the sets are not equal, we have A 6≺ B, B 6≺ A and
A 6≈ B. This means A ↪→ B and B ↪→ A, which means
there are two possible stable extensions {A} and {B} so that
neither argument is sceptically justified, and so ¬c is not
an argumentation-defined inference. However ¬c is a PDL
10It suffices to consider finite sets as arguments are finite.
11It can be shown that this definition avoids counterexamples
like [9, Example 5.1], as explained in [17].
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inference. Therefore the elitist ordering cannot be used to
calculate -.
We now investigate a modified elitist order. Suppose that
in Example 2 we use the disjoint elitist order,
Γ /DEli Γ
′ ⇔ (∃x ∈ Γ− Γ′) (∀y ∈ Γ′ − Γ) x <D y , (4.5)
with /DEli replacing /Eli in Equations 4.2 and 4.3. Given
r2 <D r3, it is easy to see that A ≺ B, B 6≺ A, and so
A 6↪→ B and B ↪→ A. Hence there is only a single stable
extension containing the now sceptically justified argument
B with conclusion ¬c.
It seems very intuitive for the disjoint elitist order to ig-
nore shared rules, because when deciding whether A - B
or B - A, we should only focus on the fallible information
on which the arguments differ.12 However, despite this intu-
itive motivation, the conclusions of the justified arguments
given by the disjoint elitist order do not correspond to those
obtained in PDL.
Example 3. Let
〈
D,W,≺+〉 have D = {dk}5k=1, W = ∅,
d1 :=
> : c1
c1
, d4 :=
c3 : c4
c4
, d3 :=
> : c3
c3
,
d2 :=
c1 : c2
c2
, d5 :=
c1 : ¬(c2 ∧ c4)
¬(c2 ∧ c4) ,
such that d1 ≺+ d4 ≺+ d3 ≺+ d2 ≺+ d5. Our PDE is
constructed in the usual manner starting from E0 = Th(∅).
Equation 2.4 gives the order of application of the defaults:
E1 = E0 + c3, E2 = E1 + c4,
E3 = E2 + c1, E4 = E3 + ¬(c2 ∧ c4) , (4.6)
with Ek = E4 for all k ≥ 5. The default d2 is blocked because
¬(c2 ∧ c4) ≡ (¬c2 ∨¬c4), and with c4 (from d4), we have ¬c2,
which blocks d2. The unique PDE from this LPDT is
Th({c1,¬c2, c3, c4}) . (4.7)
Now consider the corresponding arguments following our
instantiation. We have the defeasible rules13
r1 <D r4 <D r3 <D r2 <D r5 . (4.8)
The relevant arguments and sets of defeasible rules are
A := [[> ⇒ c1]⇒ c2] , DR(A) = {r1, r2} (4.9)
B := [[> ⇒ c3]⇒ c4] , DR(B) = {r3, r4} (4.10)
C := [[> ⇒ c1]⇒ ¬(c2 ∧ c4)] , DR(C) = {r1, r5} , (4.11)
D := [B,C → ¬c2] , DR(D) = {r1, r3, r4, r5} . (4.12)
For the correspondence to hold, the desired stable extension
is {D, B, C, [> ⇒ c3], [> ⇒ c1]} and all strict extensions
thereof14, which does have a conclusion set corresponding to
Equation 4.7. However, this would require D ↪→ A, which
means, by Equation 2.1, D ⇀ A and D 6≺ A. Clearly, D ⇀ A
on A. However, D 6≺ A is equivalent to, under the disjoint
12This has been considered in a different context in [5].
13Where, similar to Example 2, ri corresponds to di via
Equation 3.2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5.
14Informally, in ASPIC+, for S ⊆ A the strict extension of S
is the smallest set containing S extended with all strict and
firm arguments, and all possible applications of strict rules to
those arguments. This becomes the deductive closure when
ASPIC+ is instantiated into classical logic. See [13, page 370,
Definition 17] for more details.
elitist order, that r2 is <D-least in Rd. From Equation
4.8, it is not the case that r2 <D r1, r3, r4, so we conclude
D ≺ A. Therefore, argumentation does not generate the
corresponding stable extension to Equation 4.7.
Example 3 shows that we cannot use the disjoint elitist order
to compare sets of defeasible rules because it ignores the
structure of how arguments are constructed.15 The way that
PDL arranges the defaults in order of preference suggests a
new way of defining an argument preference relation com-
patible with how the arguments are constructed. We now
propose the structure-preference (SP) order. The idea is to
transform <D into a new strict total order, <SP , on Rd, such
that it captures the original preference <D and when the
defeasible rules become applicable during the construction
of the arguments.
Since we assumed Rd is finite, let 1 ≤ i ≤ |Rd|. We define
ai ∈ Rd to be the <D-greatest element of the following set:{
r ∈ RdAnte(r) ⊆ Conc
[
Args
(
i−1⋃
k=1
{ak}
)]}
−
i−1⋃
j=1
{aj} .
(4.13)
The intuition is: a1 is the most preferred rule whose ante-
cedent is amongst the conclusions of all strict arguments, a2
is the next most preferred rule, whose antecedent is amongst
the conclusions of all arguments having at most a1 as a de-
feasible rule. Similarly, a3 is the next most preferred rule,
whose antecedent is amongst the conclusions of all arguments
having at most a1 and a2 as defeasible rules, and so on until
all of the rules of Rd are exhausted. This process orders the
rules by how preferred they are under <D and by when they
are applicable when constructing the arguments. Notice that
the second union after the set difference in Equation 4.13
ensures that once a rule is applied it cannot be applied again.
We then define <SP as (notice the dual order)
ai <SP aj ⇔ j < i , (4.14)
where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ |Rd|. We define the non-strict order to
be ai ≤SP ai ⇔ [ai = aj or ai <SP aj ]. This makes sense
because i 7→ ai is bijective between Rd and {1, 2, 3, . . . , |Rd|}.
Clearly <SP is a strict total order on Rd. We call this the
structure preference order on Rd, which exists and is unique
given <D. We define the corresponding strict set comparison
relation, /SP , as, for Γ, Γ
′ ⊆fin Rd,
Γ /SP Γ
′ ⇔ (∃x ∈ Γ− Γ′) (∀y ∈ Γ′ − Γ)x <SP y . (4.15)
The corresponding strict argument preference is
A ≺SP B ⇔ DR(A) /SP DR(B) . (4.16)
We define the corresponding non-strict preference as A -SP
B ⇔ [DR(A) /SP DR(B) or DR(A) = DR(B)]. This is the
disjoint elitist order16 (Equation 4.5) with <D specialised
to <SP . The SP-order thus allows us to mimic how PDL
applies defaults when calculating extensions.
Lemma 4.1. The preference -SP satisfies
(∀A, B ∈ A) [DR(A) ⊆ DR(B)⇒ B -SP A] .
15Informally, the “structure” of an argument A is given by
the preordered set 〈Sub(A), ⊆arg〉.
16We use the disjoint elitist order instead of the usual elitist
order because Example 2 shows that the usual elitist order
does not give the correspondence in general.
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Proof. If DR(B) = DR(A) then B ≈ A, so B -SP A.
If DR(A) ⊂ DR(B), then DR(A) − DR(B) = ∅, which
means B ≺SP A is vacuously true from Equation 4.5 so
B -SP A.
This is intuitive because if A ⊆arg B, then A may contain
less fallible information (in our case defeasible rules) than
B, so A can be said to be more certain than B. It makes
sense to have B -SP A because rational agents should prefer
more certainty to less certainty. It is easy to see that strict
arguments are most preferred.
We now show that the disjoint elitist order /DEli in gen-
eral, and hence /SP in particular, is a strict total order on
Pfin (Rd).
Lemma 4.2. If 〈Rd, <D〉 is a strict toset, then /DEli is a
strict total order on Pfin(Rd).
Proof. Let Γ, Γ′, Γ′′ ∈ Pfin(Rd) be arbitrary. Irreflexivity:
From Equation 4.5, as ∃ precedes ∀, Γ /DEli Γ is false.
Transitivity: (Sketch) Assume Γ /DEli Γ
′ and Γ′ /DEli Γ′′.
Let n1, n2, . . . , n7 ∈ N be such that
Γ = {a1, . . . , an1} ∪ {d1, . . . . dn4}∪
{f1, . . . , fn6} ∪ {g1, . . . , gn7}
Γ′ = {b1, . . . , bn2} ∪ {d1, . . . . dn4}∪
{e1, . . . , en5} ∪ {g1, . . . , gn7}
Γ′′ = {c1, . . . , cn3} ∪ {e1, . . . . en5}∪
{f1, . . . , fn6} ∪ {g1, . . . , gn7} ,
where the a’s to g’s inRd denote distinct defeasible rules. The
seven disjoint finite sets {a1, . . . , an1} , . . . , {g1, . . . , gn7}
partition Γ ∪ Γ′ ∪ Γ′′ and can be represented by the subre-
gions of three overlapping circles of the corresponding Venn
diagram. If ni = 0 then the corresponding set is empty, e.g.
if n1 = 0 then {a1, . . . , an1} = ∅.
Assuming Γ /DEli Γ
′ and Γ′ /DEli Γ′′, we use Equation 4.5
to prove Γ /DEli Γ
′′, which is the equivalent of proving, for
at least one of 1 ≤ k ≤ n1 or 1 ≤ l ≤ n4,[(
n3∧
i=1
ak < ci
)
∧
(
n5∧
j=1
ak < ej
)]
or
[(
n3∧
i=1
dl < ci
)
∧
(
n5∧
j=1
dl < ej
)]
. (4.17)
By writing out Γ /DEli Γ
′ and Γ′ /DEli Γ′′ in terms of the
elements a1, . . . , gn7 similar to how Γ /DEli Γ
′′ is written in
Equation 4.17, we get four cases (as “and” and “or” bidistrib-
ute). One case gives a contradiction (due to irreflexivity of
<D), while the other three cases imply Γ /DEli Γ
′′ from the
totality of <D. Therefore, Γ /DEli Γ
′′.
Trichotomy: Assume Γ 6= Γ′ and consider Γ 	 Γ′ ∈
Pfin(Rd). The structure 〈Γ	 Γ′, <D〉 is a strict finite toset,
and thus has a <D-least element m. Either m ∈ Γ − Γ′
exclusive-or m ∈ Γ′ − Γ, where the former implies Γ /DEli Γ′
and the latter implies Γ′ /DEli Γ.
It follows that ≺SP is a strict total preorder on A.
Example 4. (Example 3 continued) By applying Equations
4.13 and 4.14, we can show that a1 = r3, a2 = r4, a3 = r1,
a4 = r5 and a5 = r2. The structure preference order is
r2 <SP r5 <SP r1 <SP r4 <SP r3 . (4.18)
Notice that this is precisely the order in which the corres-
ponding normal defaults are added in PDL, as Equation 4.6
shows. It is easy to show that the corresponding stable exten-
sion under the argument preference ≺SP corresponds to the
PDL inference, because r2 is now <SP -least, so D 6≺SP A,
therefore A ≺SP D.
However, <SP does not necessarily follow the PDL or-
der of the application of defaults as the following example
illustrates.
Example 5. Consider
〈{d1, d2} , {a} , ≺+〉 with d1 := a:¬a¬a
and d2 :=
>:b
b
such that d2 ≺+ d1. We have E = Th ({a, b}),
where d1 is blocked by W , so d2 is the only default added. In
argumentation, we have Kn = {a}, r1 := (a⇒ ¬a) and r2 :=
(> ⇒ b) where for i = 1, 2, ri := f (di), such that r2 <D r1.
The arguments are A0 := [a], A1 := [A0 ⇒ ¬a] and B :=
[> ⇒ b]. Applying Equation 4.13, we have r2 <SP r1, which
clearly is not the order of how the corresponding defaults
are added in PDL. Yet the correspondence still holds, since
A0 ↪→ A1 because A0 is strict and strict arguments always
defeat any non-strict argument they attack, so the stable
extension is the strict extension of {A0, B}, the conclusion
set of which (after deductive closure) is the extension of the
underlying LPDT.
Example 5 highlights how blocked defaults and defeated
arguments are related. Where PDL blocks the application of
a given default, hence preventing its conclusion from featuring
in the extension, ASPIC+ allows for the construction of the
argument with the corresponding defeasible rule, but that
argument is always defeated by another strictly stronger
argument and therefore cannot be in any extension.
5. THE REPRESENTATION THEOREM
In this section we state and prove the representation theorem
(Theorem 5.3), which guarantees that the inferences with ar-
gumentation semantics under the preference -SP correspond
exactly to the inferences in PDL.
5.1 Non-Blocked Defaults
We first introduce some concepts to help prove the represent-
ation theorem. Let 〈D, W, ≺〉 be a PDT and E = ⋃i∈NEi
one of its extensions generated from the linearisation ≺+⊇≺.
The set of generating defaults (with respect to ≺+), GD(≺+),
is defined as
GDi(≺+) :=
{
d ∈ D d is ≺+-greatest active in Ei
}
,
GD(≺+) :=
⋃
i∈N
GDi(≺+) ⊆ D . (5.1)
Intuitively, this is the set of defaults applied to calculate
E following the order ≺+. However, the same E can be
generated by distinct total orders.
Example 6. Consider the PDT
〈{
a:c
c
, b:c
c
}
, {a, b} , ∅〉.
We have two possible linearisations a:c
c
≺+1 b:cc and b:cc ≺+2 a:cc .
By Footnote 4 we have GD(≺+1 ) =
{
b:c
c
}
and GD(≺+2 ) ={
a:c
c
}
, which are not equal, even though both linearisations
give the same extension E = Th ({a, b, c}). But in the case
of ≺+1 , b:cc is not active not because it is blocked by ¬c, but
rather it adds no new information.
We wish to distinguish between inactive defaults that con-
flict with something we already know, and inactive defaults
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that do not add any new information. We call a default θ:φ
φ
semi-active (in S ⊆ SL) iff [θ ∈ S, ¬φ /∈ S, φ ∈ S]. The set
of semi-active defaults with respect to the linearisation ≺+ is
SAD(≺+) := {d ∈ D d is semi-active w.r.t. ≺+} . (5.2)
Intuitively, semi-active defaults add no new information. We
then define the set of non-blocked defaults to be
NBD(≺+) := GD(≺+) ∪ SAD(≺+) ⊆ D . (5.3)
NBD has a more elegant characterisation:
Lemma 5.1. If ≺+ generates the PDE E, then we have that
NBD(≺+) :=
{
θ : φ
φ
∈ D θ ∈ E, ¬φ /∈ E
}
. (5.4)
Proof. (Sketch) It is sufficient to show Equation 5.3 (with
Equations 5.1 and 5.2) is the same as the right hand side of
Equation 5.4. Let E be the extension from ≺+. For read-
ability we will omit writing “≺+” from “GD(≺+)”. It can
be shown that d := θ:φ
φ
∈ GD ⇒ [θ ∈ E, (∃i ∈ N) ¬φ /∈ Ei],
and assuming ¬φ ∈ E gives a contradiction (by consider-
ing the Ei’s in E), so ¬φ /∈ E. Trivially, d ∈ SAD ⇒
[θ ∈ E, ¬φ /∈ E], therefore Equation 5.3 is a subset of Equa-
tion 5.4. Assuming that d ∈ the right hand side of Equation
5.4 gives d ∈ GD ∪ SAD through simple quantifier manipu-
lations. The result follows.
Given E, NBD(≺+) is uniquely determined, so we will write
NBD(E) instead. Equation 5.4 adapts Reiter’s idea of a
generating default [16, page 92 Definition 2] to PDL.
5.2 Uniqueness of Stable Extensions
In this section we show that the defeat graph 〈A, ↪→〉 as-
sociated with any ASPIC+ attack graph 〈A, ⇀, -SP 〉 con-
structed from a LPDT
〈
D, W, ≺+〉 with the SP-order has
a unique stable extension.
Theorem 5.2. Let 〈A, ⇀, -SP 〉 be an ASPIC+ attack
graph constructed from L = FL, − is ¬, Rs the rules of
proof of FOL, 〈Rd, <SP 〉 the toset of defeasible rules under
the SP-order, the argument preference -SP , n is undefined
on Rd, Kp = ∅ and Kn ⊆ FL is a consistent set of formulae.
The defeat graph 〈A, ↪→〉 from this attack graph has a unique
stable extension.
Proof. (Sketch) The construction of the unique stable exten-
sion imitates how extensions are constructed over an LPDT
(Equation 2.4). Given a set of arguments S ⊆ A we define,
for r ∈ Rd, S ⊕ r := Args(DR(S) ∪ {r}), i.e. we close S
under all arguments with the addition of a new defeasible
rule r. Now consider Algorithm 1, which takes an attack
graph 〈A, ⇀, -SP 〉 obeying the conditions of the theorem,
and outputs a set of arguments.
Algorithm 1 Generating a Stable Extension
1: function GenerateStableExtension(〈A, ⇀, -SP 〉)
2: S ← {all strict arguments in A}
3: for r ∈ Rd from <SP -greatest to <SP -smallest do
4: if S ⊕ r has no attacks, (S ⊕ r)2 ∩⇀= ∅, then
5: S ← S ⊕ r
return S
The intuition of Algorithm 1 is to first create the largest
possible set of undefeated arguments that do not attack each
other, first by including all strict arguments because strict
arguments are never defeated (Line 2, recall also Example 5)
and never attack each other because Kn is consistent. Then,
the algorithm includes the defeasible rules from most to least
preferred and tests whether the resulting arguments that are
constructed by the inclusion of such a defeasible rule attack
each other (Lines 4–5). As <SP is total, all defeasible rules
are considered, and the result includes as many defeasible
rules as possible such that the result is consistent. Adding
the rules in the order of <SP while ensuring conflict freeness
mimics the condition of Equation 2.4.
It is clear from the algorithm that S exists and is unique,
as it is of the form Args(R) for some R ⊆ Rd. We show S is a
stable extension [2, page 26 Definition 2.2.7]: cf is guaranteed
by the consistency of Kn and that defeasible rules r ∈ Rd
are only added if the resulting arguments do not attack each
other. Therefore, S contains no defeats and must be cf. To
show that the arguments of S defeat all arguments not in
S, let R := DR(S), i.e. the set of all defeasible rules added
to S. Let B /∈ S be arbitrary. We find an A ∈ S such that
A ↪→ B. Given that B /∈ S, there is some rule r ∈ DR(B)−R
that causes S to attack the subargument of B with top rule
r if r is included, according to Algorithm 1, Line 4. Let
B′ ⊆arg B such that TopRule(B′) = r. Let A ∈ S be the
attacker of B′ at r. If r is <SP -greatest, then Args(∅)⊕ r
contains attacking arguments, so A must be strict and hence
A ↪→ B. If r is not <SP -greatest, then consider the strict
up-set of r in 〈Rd, <SP 〉, T := {r′ ∈ Rd r <SP r′} 6= ∅. If
T ∩ R = ∅, then adding r to S means there is an attack
from A ∈ Args(∅) under -SP , and hence B is defeated. If
T ∩R 6= ∅, then A ∈ Args(T ∩R). Assume A is not strict,
then ∅ 6= DR(A) ⊆ T ∩R, so (∀s ∈ DR(A)) r <SP s, hence
A defeats B. Therefore, in all cases, A ↪→ B, and hence B
is defeated by some argument in S. Therefore, the defeat
graphs of such ASPIC+ attack graphs have a unique stable
extension.
5.3 The Representation Theorem
In this section we state and prove the representation theorem.
This shows that inferences made in PDL correspond exactly
to the conclusions of the justified arguments in the argu-
mentation semantics of PDL by relating the stable extension
of 〈A, ↪→〉 with the extension of the corresponding LPDT〈
D, W, ≺+〉.
Theorem 5.3. Let 〈A, ⇀, -SP 〉 be the attack graph corres-
ponding to an LPDT
〈
D,W,≺+〉 with defeat graph 〈A, ↪→〉
under -SP .
1. Let E be the extension of
〈
D,W,≺+〉. Then there
exists a unique stable extension E ⊆ A of 〈A, ↪→〉 such
that Conc (E) = E.
2. Let E ⊆ A be the unique stable extension of 〈A, ↪→〉
by Theorem 5.2, then Conc(E) is the extension of〈
D,W,≺+〉.
Proof. (Sketch) To prove the first statement we construct E in
terms of E and show E is a stable extension of 〈A, ↪→〉 (which
is unique given Theorem 5.2), and show Conc(E) = E. Given
E, we construct E := Args (f (NBD(E))). This set is unique
from the properties of Args. Then we show this E is a stable
extension, which means E is cf and defeats all arguments not
belonging to it. Assume for contradiction that E is not cf,
which means there are arguments A,B ∈ E such that A ↪→ B,
which means A ⇀ B. Let a := Conc(A), and as A ∈ E ,
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DR(A) ⊆ f (NBD(E)) and hence a ∈ E. Now let B′ ⊆arg B
be the argument such that TopRule(B′) = (b⇒ ¬a) for
some appropriate formula b in B. As B ∈ E , this means
(b⇒ ¬a) ∈ f (NBD(E)) and hence a /∈ E by Equation 5.4
and that E is deductively closed – contradiction. Therefore,
E is cf. To show Args(R) defeats all other arguments, let
B /∈ Args(R) so there is some rule r ∈ DR(B) − R. Let
B′ ⊆arg B be such that TopRule(B′) = r. r corresponds
to a default f−1(r) = θ:φ
φ
/∈ NBD(E). Either θ /∈ E or
¬φ ∈ E by Equation 5.4. If ¬φ ∈ E, then one can prove
there exists an argument A ∈ Args(R) such that A ↪→ B′
and hence A ↪→ B under -SP . Assume θ /∈ E. There is some
B′′ ⊂arg B′ such that Conc(B′′) = θ. If θ /∈ E then B′′ is
neither strict nor in Args (f (NBD (E))). Thus there is some
other s ∈ DR (B′′)−f (NBD (E)). We can repeat the above
reasoning for s but not indefinitely as arguments are well-
founded. We will end up with either a strict subargument
of B′′ or an argument in Args (f (NBD(E))). Therefore,
θ ∈ E. Therefore, the only reason for r /∈ R is because
¬φ ∈ E, and hence there is an argument A that defeats
any argument containing the rule r, which means Args(R)
defeats all other arguments and hence it is a stable extension.
To show that E = Conc (E), we show E ⊆ Conc (E) and
Conc (E) ⊆ E. In the first case, let θ ∈ E, then if θ ∈ E0, we
have W |= θ and by the compactness theorem in FOL, we
have ∆ ⊆fin W such that ∆ |= θ. From this we build a strict
argument A such that Premn(A) = ∆ and Conc(A) = θ,
and necessarily A ∈ E so θ ∈ Conc (E). Similarly, if θ ∈ Ek
for some k ∈ N+, we can construct a defeasible argument
A concluding θ such that DR(A) ⊆ f (NBD(E)) and hence
A ∈ E , so θ ∈ Conc (E). Conversely, if θ ∈ Conc(E) there is
an argument in E concluding θ. If this argument is strict then
θ ∈ E0 ⊆ E, else, as the defeasible rules are in f (NBD(E))
then θ ∈ Ek ⊆ E for some k ∈ N+ that indicates when all of
the appropriate defaults needed to conclude θ are included.
This establishes the first statement.
For the second statement, we show Conc(E) ⊆ E and
E ⊆ Conc(E). For the former, if θ ∈ Conc(E) then there is
some A ∈ E concluding θ. If A is strict then θ ∈ E0 ⊆ E. If A
is defeasible, then say DR(A) = {di}ki=1 for some k ∈ N+. All
of these defaults do not introduce any inconsistency because
E is stable and hence cf. Take the smallest i ∈ N such that
sufficiently many corresponding defeasible rules are applied
from DR(A) to conclude θ in Ei+1 from W . Therefore,
θ ∈ Ei+1 ⊆ E. Conversely, let θ ∈ E, so there is some i ∈ N
such that θ ∈ Ei. If i = 0, then there is a strict argument
A, necessarily in E , that concludes θ so θ ∈ Conc (E). If
i > 0, then we can use the appropriate defeasible rules to
construct a defeasible argument A such that Prem(A) ⊆W ,
Conc(A) = θ and DR(A) 6= ∅. To show A ∈ E , we assume
for contradiction that A /∈ E so there is some B ∈ E such
that B ↪→ A. But this would result in at least one of the
defaults of A being blocked. This is a contradiction because
given that θ ∈ E, the defeasible argument A concluding θ
cannot have its defeasible rules correspond to blocked PDL
defaults. Therefore, such a B cannot exist and A ∈ E . This
proves that Conc(E) = E.
The representation theorem means that PDL is sound and
complete with respect to its argumentation semantics. We
now show that this ASPIC+ instantiation to PDL satisfies
the Caminada-Amgould rationality postulates (Section 2.2.2)
as a corollary to the representation theorem. Recall that
when instantiated to FOL, ClRs becomes deductive closure.
Theorem 5.4. Let 〈A, ⇀, -SP 〉 be the ASPIC+ attack
graph of PDL and let E be any of the admissible extensions
of the corresponding defeat graph 〈A, ↪→〉. Our instantiation
satisfies the Caminada-Amgoud rationality postulates.
Proof. By Theorem 5.2, 〈A, ↪→〉 has a unique stable extension
E , which is a complete and an admissible extension. It is
sufficient to prove the postulates for E because 〈A, ↪→〉 only
has E as its sole complete extension. (1) To show that
E is subargument closed, recall that Algorithm 1 gives an
explicit construction of E , which is of the form Args(R)
for some R ⊆ Rd and is clearly subargument closed. (2)
The representation theorem states that Conc (E) = E and
as E is deductively closed, Conc (E) is closed under strict
rules. (3) As W is consistent and Conc (E) is the extension,
Conc (E) must also be consistent and its deductive closure is
consistent.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have endowed PDL [4] with argumentation semantics
using ASPIC+ [13]. This is achieved by specialising ASPIC+
to PDL (Section 3), discussing which preferences can be
suitable for the correspondence of inferences (Section 4),
proving that the inferences do correspond (Theorem 5.3),
and that this instantiation is normatively rational (Theorem
5.4). As explained in Section 1, this allows us to interpret
the inferences of PDL as conclusions of justified arguments,
clarifying the reasons for accepting or rejecting a conclusion.
Further, this makes the inference process more intuitive, and
amenable to human participation and inspection. The argu-
mentative characterisation of PDL provides for distributed
reasoning in the course of deliberation and persuasion dia-
logues. For example, BOID agents with PDL representations
of mental attitudes can now exchange arguments and coun-
terarguments when deliberating about which goals to select,
and consequently which actions to pursue (Example 1).
However, it seems that we have restricted our attention to
LPDTs. This does not lose generality because calculating
extensions in PDL always presupposes a linearisation ≺+
of ≺ (see [4] or recall Section 2.3), and Theorem 5.4 shows
that for any linearisation the correspondence between PDL
and its argumentation semantics holds. However, ASPIC+
can identify argumentation-based inferences assuming only
a partial ordering, unlike in PDL. This suggests that our
argumentative characterisation can be used to generalise
PDL; for example, under a partial ordering one might not only
generate multiple stable extensions, but extensions under
other Dung semantics17 may become relevant. Future work
will look at to what extent we can lift the requirement of
linearity, as well as the significance of other Dung semantics.
Further, one aspect of ASPIC+ that has not been discussed
in much detail here is how normative rationality (in the
sense of [7]) follows for any well-defined instantiation with a
reasonable preference [13, Definitions 12 and 18]. We have
shown that our instantiation is normatively rational via a
direct proof, but it is worthwhile strengthening this result
by asking whether the instantiation we have presented here
is well-defined and whether -SP is reasonable. This would
also allow us to investigate generalisations and variations of
PDL via its argumentation semantics.
17When the extension is unique, the distinction between the
different Dung semantic types is lost.
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